It’s the other side of the coin: the resilience that has impressed the world since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Ukrainians don’t frighten easily or get discouraged, but they don’t impress easily either. Donald Trump’s shift on Ukraine last week, sending U.S. weaponry to Kyiv after the Pentagon had held it up, has been met with skepticism, black humor, and hope.
“Wow, 10 Patriot missiles,” someone calling himself Jerzy posted sarcastically in a July 8 Telegram chat after Trump reversed the pause of weapons deliveries. Shortly after the president’s remarks, sources revealed he was planning to send a small first shipment of these prized air-defense interceptors—the only weapons that can shoot down the high-speed ballistic missiles Moscow now launches at Ukrainian cities virtually every night. “Ridiculous,” “insulting,” “a mockery,” others chimed in on the chat before someone named Reti nailed the case: “Ukraine will easily fire 10 Patriot missiles in the space of an hour defending themselves from Russia,” he explained. Sources say it generally takes three or four interceptors to stop one Russian ballistic missile, and in just two days last week, Moscow hit Ukraine with a total of 14 rockets.
The skeptics could be wrong. If it holds, Trump’s shift is dramatic, potentially a historic turning point. After suggesting for months that Ukraine was the problem—responsible for the war and the obstacle to peace—Trump finally seems to recognize that it’s Vladimir Putin who doesn’t want to stop fighting. “We get a lot of bullsh*t thrown at us by Putin,” the president told a Cabinet meeting last week. “But it turns out to be meaningless.”
The 47th president also seemed to acknowledge that the U.S. can’t just abandon Ukraine. “We are going to have to send more weapons,” he told reporters, “defensive weapons. [The Ukrainians] have to defend themselves.”
But as promising as Trump’s shift may seem, it’s only as valuable as what comes next. The president had some success last month using strong language—an F-bomb—to pressure Israel and Iran to accept a ceasefire. But unlike Jerusalem and Tehran, Putin isn’t deterred by a four-letter word.
Trump had lambasted the Russian strongman before and seemed to tilt momentarily in favor of Ukraine, only to revert to form days later. Meanwhile, despite threats, Washington hasn’t taken action against Moscow—no new tariffs, increased sanctions, or additional weapons appropriations for Ukraine since Trump returned to the White House.
What’s needed now: Trump must quickly follow talk with action before Moscow changes the facts on the ground in Ukraine.
Moscow is several weeks into a savage summer offensive—what captured Russian officers have been told is “one last push” to seize more territory and break Ukrainian morale. Russian soldiers are massing along the front line and making small but growing inroads near critical chokepoints. Drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have escalated sharply in recent weeks, growing fiercer than ever in the days since Trump reversed the weapons pause.
A year ago, a typical nightly bombardment consisted of 10 to 25 drones nationwide, with cruise and ballistic missiles reserved for a rare extra wallop. The barrage early Tuesday, June 9, after Trump’s apparent change of heart, was the biggest aerial attack of the war: 728 drones and 13 missiles. The count on July 10 was 397 drones, 10 cruise missiles, and eight of the especially deadly ballistic missiles. Ukraine needs help—American and European help—to fight off this intensifying assault.
Few strategists expect Moscow to make decisive gains this summer, seizing the lion’s share of Ukrainian territory or toppling the government. No one anticipates that Kyiv will liberate the fifth of the country held by Russia any time soon. But Trump’s proposed approach—helping Ukraine defend itself—is not enough.
Defense by itself, with no offense, is just a way of losing more slowly, as Trump of all people should know. That was Joe Biden’s failing strategy: Give Ukraine just enough military aid to avoid defeat but not enough to win the war. What’s needed now: enough military assistance and economic pressure to change Russia’s calculus of the war’s costs and benefits and give Ukraine the upper hand in negotiations.
Ideally, Trump would encourage Congress to pass a big military-aid package. That may be too much to hope for in the near term. But the president can and should take three critical steps to implement his new understanding of Ukraine’s plight: tighten U.S. sanctions on Moscow, open the door for Europe to use its considerable economic leverage over Russia, and allow Ukraine and its proxies in Europe to purchase weapons directly from U.S. defense contractors.
Tough new sanctions legislation co-sponsored by Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal would bar energy transactions with Russian banks and punish countries like China and India that still buy Russian oil and gas despite Western curbs. The bill from the South Carolina Republican and Connecticut Democrat would subject these third countries to 500 percent tariffs on their exports to the U.S. It leaves ample leeway for Trump to delay imposing penalties. But the president is pushing for an even freer hand. This loophole should be resisted.
Still, the bill has 85 Senate co-sponsors, and House Speaker Mike Johnson says there is “interest” in the House. If implemented in the coming months, it could severely damage the Russian economy, already teetering on the brink of recession after three years of choking civilian businesses to supercharge weapons production and military salaries. Meanwhile, in a separate step, Trump could redouble American economic pressure by cracking down on countries that buy U.S. technology and resell it to Moscow for use in Russian missiles and fighter jets.
Europe can help. In 2021, the European Union did nearly eight times as much business with Russia as the U.S. did—roughly $270 billion in total trade versus $36 billion—and Europe, too, is poised to tighten the economic screws on Moscow.
A proposed 18th package of EU sanctions would expand restrictions on Russian energy imports, ban business with second-tier Russian banks, and block exports of Western technology used in Russian drone and weapons production. But the bloc has struggled to pass the measure, hamstrung by opposition from Russia-friendly Hungary and Slovakia. What Trump could do to help: put pressure on MAGA allies in both countries to push the package over the finish line.
American participation would open the door to the EU’s biggest proposed blow to the Russian economy, cutting the West’s 2022 oil price cap from $60 to $45 a barrel. Perhaps even more potent, encouraging signals from Trump could help persuade European holdouts to move toward seizing the €300 billion in Russian assets frozen in Western banks since the 2022 invasion.
But economic pressure alone is unlikely to suffice. Russia must also feel it on the battlefield. Putin needs to see the futility of prolonging the war and sustaining current losses of more than 1,000 soldiers a day.
Volodymyr Zelensky has been talking for months about putting Ukraine’s relationship with the U.S. on a new footing, shifting away from traditional military aid, an unlikely prospect in Trump’s Washington, to buying U.S. weapons directly from American manufacturers, as allies from Poland to Taiwan do.
At first, Trump blew off the idea of direct sales, but he appears to be coming around. Ultimately, Europe would have to provide most or all of the funding, either as aid to the cash-strapped Ukraine or by contracting directly with U.S. manufacturers. But both Germany and Norway have expressed interest in purchasing Patriot missile systems for Kyiv, and Trump told reporters last week that the U.S. would now send weapons to Ukraine through NATO, with the alliance paying for those weapons “a hundred percent.”
This is still just a fledgling idea. U.S. weapons sales are highly regulated, with both exports and future use subject to exacting federal oversight, and negotiations are just getting started. But if the idea works for Patriots, it could be applied to a broad range of weapons sales—everything Ukraine can’t make itself and Europe can’t supply.
Just how far will Trump go? Even now—even recognizing that Putin is the aggressor and the U.S. can’t walk away—he maintains that the Ukraine conflict is Biden’s war. But it’s hard to see how he can have it both ways. Selling rather than giving arms and working through NATO are fig leaves. Unless he reverses himself yet again—softening his tone on Russia and reengaging with the Kremlin—Trump is on track to own the war.
Of course, another 180-degree turn is possible, and few in Ukraine or Europe are counting on the mercurial president to stay the course. According to the latest polling, 60 percent of Ukrainians are prepared to endure the war for “as long as necessary,” and 74 percent support fighting on even without U.S. support. The one thing they know for sure is that no matter what Trump does next, his promise to end the war still hinges on Putin, and the Kremlin shows no sign of relenting.

