Many Ukrainians, used to making the best of bad situations, reacted to Donald Trump’s reelection with caustic humor. Among the most heard jokes play off his promise to end the war with Russia in 24 hours. “Has everyone set their timers?” one man asked on Facebook. But underneath the repartee, Ukrainians are tired—ground down by a war, now all but stalemated, that will soon enter its fourth year. So they wait, half-frightened, half-hopeful, for what could be a disastrous defeat or a welcome reprieve.
Few here doubt that Trump’s team will push for negotiations, requiring compromises from both sides but sacrifices mostly from Ukrainians. Morally, this is monstrous. Ukrainians are guilty of nothing but building their country, growing its economy, and yearning for an independent, democratic future. The Kremlin’s crimes, in contrast, are unending. They include the unlawful annexation of Crimea in 2014, a ten-year proxy war in eastern Ukraine, the unprovoked 2022 invasion, the kidnapping of some 20,000 Ukrainian children, and nearly three years of deadly missile strikes on schools, hospitals, and civilian targets in cities across a country of 40 million, to name just a few.
The world’s leading champion of might-makes-right, Vladimir Putin, flouts international norms and sides unashamedly with America’s enemies, from Iran to North Korea. Yet, under Trump, Kyiv and Moscow will now be treated as moral equivalents, two equal parties across a negotiating table, each expected to give a little to get a deal.
But indignation and outrage will do little to help Ukraine in the months ahead as the two sides jockey and the Trump team fine-tunes its approach. Even as the grim game plays out, some outcomes would be better than others—a relatively good peace versus an unspeakable, debilitating deal.
At one end of the spectrum, Putin gets everything he wants—a defeated, demoralized, demilitarized gray zone on his southern flank, its inhabitants subject to his will and its economy open to exploitation. At the other end, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky finds a way to declare at least a partial victory. After all, he and his nation withstood the 2022 Russian onslaught not for three days, as initially predicted, but nearly three years. Their courage and determination won the world’s respect, reminding Europe of its democratic values and reinvigorating NATO. Perhaps most important for Ukraine, the war has accelerated its integration into Europe, strengthening global ties, spurring internal reforms, and easing its path toward a democratic market economy.
Challenges abound for Europe’s poorest nation, and Ukrainians will be nursing their wounds for decades. But what they get from the deal—and how they frame it for themselves—could make all the difference for the future. A potentially smaller but vibrant, hopeful country at peace could attract international investment and inspire millions of refugees to return and rebuild. A defeated, discouraged vassal state will backslide into Moscow’s orbit, making life miserable for Ukrainians and encouraging Putin to try the same lawless aggression elsewhere in Europe. The world saw the playbook this fall in neighboring Georgia and Moldova, where Moscow spent millions to rig elections and bring down democratically elected governments.
Ultimately, only Ukrainians can determine if the deal is a good peace—or good enough. Ideally, Washington would first start with an infusion of military aid—enough long-range missile systems, artillery, ammunition, and air defenses to stabilize the front line and then enable Ukraine to negotiate from a position of strength. Trump won’t want to do this, but he may find he must in order to stop Russia’s momentum on the battlefield and bring Putin to the table. Then, once the talks get going, four key questions must be considered and resolved.
The first, likely among the most disappointing for Ukrainians, is where and how to pause the fighting—the ceasefire line. Most observers believe Putin still hopes to occupy all of Ukraine, and he openly claims four large provinces, including considerable territory still controlled by Kyiv. Ukraine’s stated position, still supported by most of its citizens, is the exact mirror image; they understandably want all their land back. The answer will almost surely be a compromise—starting with how much of Russia’s Kursk province, now fiercely contested, Kyiv controls when negotiations begin and how much occupied Ukrainian land Moscow will consent to trade for that conquered territory.
Also critically important, Ukraine will insist on distinguishing between de jure and de facto acceptance of the ceasefire line. Moscow will want a formal treaty recognizing that the Ukrainian land it’s seizing belongs to Russia. The West must resist—anything else would be an abject surrender to might makes right.
The second pillar of any deal, arguably the most important, is a security guarantee to prevent future Russian aggression. For 30 years, and indeed long before, Moscow violated virtually every deal it agreed to in Ukraine, promising an exchange or a ceasefire or some other concession only to break its word. The way to prevent this is by admitting Ukraine to NATO—the sooner, the better. Several NATO members are hesitant to take the risk—Article 5 of the organization’s 75-year-old charter would deem a Russian attack on one an attack of all—and Trump is unlikely to agree to Ukrainian membership.
How to square that circle will be the heart—and test—of any deal. One answer would be European peacekeeping troops on the ground in Ukraine accompanied by significant military aid—many times the fighter jets, air defenses, long-range missiles, tanks, and other equipment donated by the West in the past three years—and a promise, at some future date, to reconsider NATO membership. Russia will oppose all this; it wants a neutral Ukraine with diminished military prowess, barred from NATO. And in this case, too, the West must resist—lest it invite renewed Russian aggression, perhaps before the end of the decade.
The third question that must be answered at the negotiating table is how to curb Moscow’s influence in Ukraine, both in the territories it occupies and more broadly. The past is a sobering preview. Since Ukrainian independence in 1991, Russia has used proxies, sabotage, espionage, political meddling, economic coercion, and more to dominate Ukraine, sowing corruption and undermining democracy. Even worse, in the regions occupied in 2014 and those overrun since 2022, Moscow has plundered industry and agriculture, dismissed democratically elected officials, replaced local populations with migrants from Russia, and sought to eradicate Ukrainian culture.
No guarantee can be 100 percent effective against this kind of subjugation, particularly in occupied territories. But any agreement must erect guardrails and give Kyiv the tools to fend off future interference.
The last big issues will be restitution and reconstruction—how to make Ukraine whole after years of Russian depredation. Any deal must include a full prisoner exchange, return of the 20,000 deported children, and mechanisms that allow Kyiv to seek justice for Russian war crimes. More controversial but equally important, Russia should bear the brunt of rebuilding Ukraine, ideally using some $300 billion in Russian assets frozen in Western accounts. The best option would be to seize those assets before negotiations and use Western weapons as leverage to bring Moscow to the table.
Just how tough a deal is Trump likely to press for? No one knows, perhaps not even Trump. Voices in and outside the administration are trying to stiffen his spine against Moscow by reminding him how humiliating it would be to repeat America’s retreat from Afghanistan in Ukraine. Pro-Ukraine Republicans in the House and Senate will exert some influence, as will European allies, especially if they are expected to help keep the peace.
Ultimately, no matter how “good” a deal is struck, it will be lipstick on a pig. Despite their considerable generosity and aid, the U.S. and Europe bear much responsibility for the ugly facts on the ground—America’s hesitancy and Europe’s inability to supply Kyiv with weaponry to match its aggressor. But what’s done is done. The imperative now is to help Ukraine forge the best possible deal and provide the guarantees to ensure it holds.
